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Abstract
This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare impli-
cations in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-
connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibit-
ing low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel
so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hub-
bing strategies when costs are su¢ ciently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one
carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite
interestingly, ight frequency can become excessive under HS network congurations.
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1 Introduction
Before the deregulation of the airline sector (that took place during the 1980s in the US
and during the 1990s in Europe), carriers faced constraints in fares and route structures
and competition was concentrated in service quality (ight frequency). The deregulation
introduced a new source of competition focused on airfares. In this new competitive envi-
ronment with fares determined by market forces, carriers also became free to make strategic
network choices. The success of hub-and-spoke structures in the years following the dereg-
ulation led to a concentration of tra¢ c on the spoke routes producing an increase of ight
frequency, as documented in Morrison and Whinston (1995) and commented in Brueckner
(2004).1
Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007) (hereafter BF) present a simple duopoly model of
schedule competition in a single market, where airlines compete both in fares and schedul-
ing decisions. This dual-competition pattern is studied in a setting that captures the
most important elements characterizing the airline sector after its deregulation. Neverthe-
less, the analysis needs to be completed to allow for network choices in a multi-market
framework. The wide-ranging network reorganization observed after the deregulation with
the adoption of hubbing strategies, supports the idea of introducing this element into the
analysis.
Thus, in an unregulated context where carriers may organize their networks either fully-
connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS),2 this paper aims at applying the simple duopoly
model of schedule competition introduced by BF to capture optimal network choices and
analyze their welfare implications. The comparison between the two network categories
is studied in Brueckner (2004) for the monopoly case and we extend this analysis to a
duopoly setting.
In its modeling, this paper tries to capture the important elements characterizing the
airline sector after its deregulation. Airlines compete in airfares and scheduling decisions,
travelers exhibit brand loyalty (i.e., they have a utility gain from using a particular airline)
and markets are partially served by airlines. In addition, cost per seat realistically falls
with aircraft size, capturing the presence of economies of tra¢ c density (i.e., economies
from operating a larger aircraft) that are unequivocal in the airline industry.
In fact, brand loyalty is an important element of the airline industry, especially since
the proliferation of frequent-yer-programs and worldwide alliances (although brand loyalty
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may also reect idiosyncratic consumer preferences for particular aspects of airline service
that may di¤er across carriers). In this framework, the possibility of having partially-served
markets by airlines is achieved by introducing in the analysis an outside option that can
be interpreted as an alternative transport mode such as automobile, train or ship. In this
way, passengers with low brand loyalty do not undertake air travel and make use of the
outside option. Di¤erently from BF, there is single group of passengers and the relevant
margin of choice (either airline/airline; or airline/outside option) is determined endoge-
nously depending on the cost of the outside option relative to the frequency-airfare pair
o¤ered by each carrier.3
Thus, the originality of the present paper lies in putting together the elements in BF
and Brueckner (2004) that constitute the building blocks of the unregulated airline sector
in a way that carriers are free to make strategic network choices in a competitive context
where city-pair markets may be uncovered by airlines. Under this specication, the aim
of the paper is twofold. On the one hand, it attempts to describe the possible equilibria
in airline networks when carriers decide between FC and HS network strategies. In this
vein, the paper links fare-and-frequency choices and uncovered markets with the network
structures arising in equilibrium. On the other hand, the paper provides a welfare analysis
so as to assess the results obtained in equilibrium under the di¤erent network specications.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows. In a framework where air-transport
costs are su¢ ciently low, carriers adopt hubbing strategies, as happened following the
deregulation of the industry. As costs increase, economies of tra¢ c density weaken and
airlines incentives to pool passengers from several markets into the same plane vanish.
Consequently, FC structures occur in equilibrium when costs are su¢ ciently high. In
addition, asymmetric congurations where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other
chooses a HS strategy may arise without introducing any explicit asymmetry (neither in
costs nor in demand parameters). This result captures the actual coexistence of alternative
network strategies in the airline industry.
The analysis of the social optimum reveals that frequencies characterizing FC network
structures are suboptimal, conrming the results in BF and Brueckner (2004). This nding
seems to be accurate in a single-market setting but not in the current unregulated envi-
ronment where most carriers organize their networks in a HS manner. Quite interestingly,
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ight frequency can become excessive under HS network congurations when markets are
partially served. This outcome constitutes an explanation to the apparent overprovision of
frequencies in the current airline unregulated environment, which is closely related to the
adoption of hubbing strategies (that caused an increase in ight frequencies).
There are some previous contributions to the analysis of airline networks that mostly
focus on the phenomenon of hubbing that became an issue in the airline sector after the
deregulation when airlines started to pool passengers from several markets into the same
plane. In this vein, Oum et al. (1995) nd out that hubbing reduces costs and is typically
a dominant strategy for carriers. From a more general approach, Hendricks et al. (1999)
show that HS networks are likely to arise when carriers do not compete aggressively. Barla
and Constantatos (2005), in a setting where each airline decides on its capacity under
demand uncertainty, observe that HS networks help the rm to lower its cost of excess ca-
pacity in the case of low demand and to improve its capacity allocation in the case of high
demand. Finally, with a numerical example, Alderighi et al. (2005) suggest the possibility
of asymmetric equilibria when the size of the internal markets is large.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the network and computes
the equilibrium frequency and airfare in each of the three scenarios. Section 3 analyzes
the equilibria in airline networks given the results in Section 2 (proceeding by backwards
induction). Section 4 characterizes the social optimum, comparing optimal frequencies and
tra¢ c levels to those emerging in equilibrium. Finally, a brief concluding section closes the
paper. All the proofs are provided in Appendix B.
2 The Model
We assume the simplest possible network with three cities (A, B and H), two airlines (1
and 2) and three city-pair markets (AH, BH and AB) as shown in Figure 1.4 AH and
BH are always served nonstop and AB can be served either directly or indirectly with a
one-stop trip via hub H, depending on airlinesnetwork choices. Travel in market AB can
be also carried out by means of an outside option that can be interpreted as an alternative
transport mode such as automobile, train or ship. Passenger population size in each of the
city-pair markets is normalized to unity and it is assumed that all the passengers travel,
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but a proportion of them may not undertake air-travel in market AB whenever they pre-
fer the outside option.5 For instance, let us consider three Spanish cities like Barcelona,
Alicante and Palma de Mallorca. Both Iberia and Spanair airlines serve the three city-pair
markets (typically nonstop), but passengers willing to travel between Barcelona and Ali-
cante have a signicant outside option since they can also take a fast train (i.e., Euromed
train) connecting both cities.
In the model, utility for a consumer traveling by air is given by c + service quality +
travel benefit, where c is consumption expenditure and equals Y   pi for consumers using
airline i with i = 1; 2. Y denotes income and is assumed to be uniform across consumers
without loss of generality, and pi is airline is fare. Service quality measures ight exibility
and is determined by the frequency of ights o¤ered by a particular airline that enhances
passengers utility.6 Finally, as in BF, travel benefit has two components: b, equal to the
gain from travel, and a, the airline brand-loyalty variable.
Without brand loyalty, the airline with the most attractive frequency/fare combination
would attract all the passengers in the market. However, in presence of brand loyalty,
consumers are presumed to have a preference for a particular carrier, which means that
an airline with an inferior frequency/airfare combination can still attract some passengers.
Following Brueckner and Whalen (2000), this approach is formalized by specifying a utility
gain from using airline 1 rather than airline 2, denoted a, and assuming that this gain is
uniformly distributed over the range [ =2; =2], so that half the consumers prefer airline
1 and half prefer airline 2. Therefore, a varies across consumers. Interestingly,  is a
measure of (exogenous) product di¤erentiation in the sense that a small  indicates similar
products and thus small gain from using one airline or the other; whereas a big  allows for
signicant utility gains depending on passengers preferred carrier. Redening Y + b  y,
utility from air travel on carrier 1 is given by y+f1 p1+a with a > 0 for passengers loyal
to this carrier. Note that all consumers value ight frequency equally under the present
approach and the utility coe¢ cient for f is normalized to 1 (heterogeneity arises instead
through brand loyalty).
The analysis that follows derives the demand function and introduces airlines cost
structure. It is just presented for carrier 1 for simplicity reasons. The corresponding ex-
pressions for carrier 2 come up simply by interchanging 1 and 2 subscripts.
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City-pair markets AH and BH (that are identical) are always fully served by airlines
since there is no outside option. Thus, passengers will y with carrier 1 when y+f1 p1+a >
y + f2   p2, or when
a > p1   p2   f1 + f2. (1)
Quite intuitively, for the consumer to choose airline 1, the minimum required brand-loyalty
level increases with airline 1s airfare and decreases with its frequency, relative to the ones
determined by carrier 2. Otherwise, the consumer will choose airline 2. Then, carrier 1s
tra¢ c is given by
q1 =
Z =2
p1 p2 f1+f2
1

da, (2)
where 1= gives the density of a. Carrying out the integration, we obtain the following
expression:
q1 =
1
2
  1

(p1   p2   f1 + f2). (3)
In market AB, a passenger making use of the outside option perceives a utility equal
to y   g, where g stands for the (xed) cost of the outside option. Nevertheless, when the
outside option is very expensive, it becomes irrelevant since air travel is always chosen by
all the passengers. In this case, the demand function in market AB has the same form as
(3), i.e.,
Q1 =
1
2
  1

(P1   P2   F1 + F2), (4)
where capital letters denote airfares and frequencies in market AB.
On the other hand, when the outside option is su¢ ciently cheap, it attracts some
passengers (i.e., markets become partially served by airlines) and carriers compete against
the outside option. In this context, passengers opt for air-travel when y+F1 P1+a > y g
or when
a > P1   F1   g. (5)
Then, carrier 1s tra¢ c is given by
Q1 =
Z =2
P1 F1 g
1

da =
1
2
  1

(P1   F1   g). (6)
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Since passenger population size in each of the city-pair markets equals the unity, the tra¢ c
that will make use of the outside option will be 1 Q1  Q2.
To characterize the equilibrium in airfares and frequencies, we need to specify airlines
cost structure. It is important to point out that costs borne by airlines are route-dependent
(and not market-dependent),7 so that they depend on the number of links operated by the
airline.8 A ights operating cost is given by fxy1 + s
xy
1 where f
xy
1 and s
xy
1 stand for
carrier 1s plane frequency and aircraft size (i.e., the number of seats) along a certain
route xy = AH;BH;AB. Parameters  and  are the marginal cost per departure (or
aircraft-operation cost) and the marginal cost per seat, respectively.
Cost per departure (fxy1 ) is increasing with frequency because airport slots are scarce
and therefore an increase in congestion results in higher landing fees during peak hours as
argued in Heimer and Shy (2006). This cost consists of fuel for the duration of the ight,
airport maintenance, renting the gate to board and disembark the passengers, landing and
air-tra¢ c control fees.
As in BF and Brueckner (2004), it is assumed that all seats are lled, so that load factor
equals 100% and therefore sxy1 = q
xy
1;tot=f
xy
1 , i.e., aircraft size can be determined residually
dividing airlines total tra¢ c on a route by the the number of planes. Note that cost per
seat, that can be written qxy1;tot=(s
xy
1 )
2+ , visibly decreases with sxy1 capturing the presence
of economies of tra¢ c density (i.e., economies from operating a larger aircraft) that are
unequivocal in the airline industry.
Therefore, carrier 1s total cost from operating in route xy is fxy1 (f
xy
1 + s
xy
1 ) or equiv-
alently
Cxy1 (q
xy
1;tot; f
xy
1 ) = (f
xy
1 )
2 + qxy1;tot. (7)
Since routes AH and BH are identical, then CAH1 () = CBH1 ().
Airline 1s equilibrium airfares and frequencies depend on 1s network choice but also
on the network conguration adopted by the other airline. The next step consists in com-
puting this equilibrium using (3), (4), (6) and (7), and ascertaining the critical values
of g making the outside option relevant in each network scenario: (FC,FC), (HS,HS) and
(FC,HS). In order to compute the equilibrium fares and frequencies, we need to distinguish
two di¤erent potential situations depending on the cost of the outside option (g) in market
AB:
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(i) Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). In this case, the outside option can be
disregarded since it is never employed and then the relevant margin of choice for passengers
is airline 1/airline 2.
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). The outside option becomes attractive
for low brand-loyalty travelers and the relevant margin of choice for passengers becomes
preferred airline/outside option.
Hence, airlines only compete against each other when markets are fully-served. When
this is not the case, airlines compete against the outside option. The network scenarios
(FC,FC) and (HS,HS) yield a symmetric equilibrium and the results are just presented for
carrier 1 for simplicity reasons.
Note that, after knowing the fare-and-frequency choice under each possible network
scenario, we will explore in Section 3 the incentives for carriers to implement a certain
network conguration.
2.1 The (FC,FC) Network Scenario
With this network conguration, all the three city-pair markets are served nonstop9 since
both airlines o¤er a direct ight between cities A and B and airline 1s prot function is
computed by adding revenues and subtracting costs:
1 = 2 p1q1|{z}
RAH1 =R
BH
1
+ P1Q1| {z }
RAB1
  2[(f1)2 + q1| {z }]
CAH1 =C
BH
1
  [(F1)2 + Q1| {z }
CAB1
]. (8)
(i) Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). The three markets are symmetric and
thus, p1 = P1, f1 = F1, q1 = Q1 and CAH1 = C
BH
1 = C
AB
1 = (f1)
2 + q1. Hence, (8)
becomes 1 = 3[p1q1   (f1)2   q1] and using (3) we obtain
1 = 3[(p1   )(1
2
  1

(p1   p2   f1 + f2))  (f1)2]. (9)
Airline 1 chooses p1 and f1 simultaneously10 to maximize (9) yielding
f 1 = F

1 =
1
4
and p1 = P

1 =  +

2
, (10)
where superscript  denotes equilibrium values where all markets are fully served. Quite
naturally, the equilibrium frequency is decreasing with the aircraft-operation cost (). On
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the other hand, the airfare equals the marginal cost of a seat () plus a markup that
depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation (=2) and, as di¤erentiation disappears,
the fare converges to the marginal cost recovering the Bertrand-equilibrium outcome, as
in BF. Finally, each airline carries half of the population (i.e., q1 = Q

1 = 1=2) since all the
passengers undertake air travel.
It is important to recall that the values in (10) are the ones obtained in equilibrium as
long as g is high and thus y + F1   P1 + a > y   g and y + F2   P2   a > y   g hold for
any value of a (when the contrary occurs, i.e., y + F1   P1 + a < y   g is possible for low
values of a, airlines compete against the outside option and low brand-loyalty passengers
do not use airlinesservice). In equilibrium, y + F 1   P 1 + a = y + F 2   P 2   a occurs
when a = 0 and thus, fully-served markets require g > gFC  P 1   F 1 as shown in Figure
2. Replacing P 1 and F

1 with their equilibrium values this threshold value of g becomes
gFC =  +

2
  1
4
. (11)
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). In this case, we need to di¤erentiate
markets AH and BH where airlines compete against each other, from market AB where
the relevant margin of choice is preferred airline/outside option. From plugging (3) and
(6) into (8) and maximizing, we obtain
F 1 =
=2 + g   
4   1 , P

1 =
2(=2 + g + )  
4   1 , (12)
where superscript  denotes equilibrium values where market AB is partially served and
f 1 = f

1 and p

1 = p

1 (see (10)). Quite naturally, the proportion of passengers choosing
air travel increases with the cost of the alternative mode of transport (g). Unsurprisingly,
when g rises, airlines gain monopoly power and react by increasing fares (P1). Markets
AH and BH are fully served with q1 = q

2 = 1=2 and market AB is partially served
since some passengers choose the outside option to travel (i.e., Q1 +Q

2 < 1). These are
the values obtained in equilibrium as long as g is low, i.e., y + F 1   P 1 + a < y   g
and y + F 2   P 2   a < y   g hold for low brand-loyalty passengers. As before, in
equilibrium y + F 1   P 1 + a = y + F 2   P 2   a occurs when a = 0, and airlines
start competing against the outside option when g < gFC (i.e., when the outside option
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is su¢ ciently cheap). Note that gFC turns out to be exactly the expression in (11), i.e.,
gFC = P

1   F 1 = P 1   F 1 =  + =2  1=4.
When market AB is partially served, passengers with low values of brand loyalty (a)
are the rst ones to choose the outside option. Hence, there is a brand-loyalty threshold
denoted by aFC , delimiting the passengers that y with their preferred carrier (passengers
with a > aFC) from those that make use of the outside option (passengers with a < aFC),
as shown in Figure 3. Hence, the threshold delimiting the relevant margin of choice can
be expressed both in terms of a and g. From y+F 1  P 1 + a = y  g, the threshold aFC
can be easily derived:
aFC = P

1   F 1   g. (13)
Note that, when market AB is fully served, then aFC = 0 and g = P 1   F 1 . Then,
it is easy to check that F 1 = f

1 = f

1 =
1
4
and P 1 = p

1 = p

1 =  +

2
.11 Equivalently,
when g = gFC we also recover the results with fully-served markets.
2.2 The (HS,HS) Network Scenario
With this network conguration, route AB is abandoned by both carriers and city-pair
market AB is served through a two-segment trip with stop at the hub city H.12 Thus,
airline 1s prot is now
1 = 2 p1q1|{z}
RAH1 =R
BH
1
+ P1Q1| {z }
RAB1
  2[(f1)2 + (q1 +Q1)| {z }
CAH1 =C
BH
1
], (14)
because CAH1 (q
AH
1;tot; f
AH
1 ) is link-dependent and incorporates all the tra¢ c passing through
route AH, i.e., qAH1;tot = q1 +Q1.
(i) Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). Plugging (3) and (4) into (14) and maxi-
mizing, we obtain
f 1 =
3
8
, p1 =  +

2
and P 1 = 2 +

2
. (15)
Comparing these values with the ones obtained under the (FC,FC) scenario (see (10)), it is
easy to check that frequencies are now higher since there is more tra¢ c in each of the two
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active routes AH and BH (as in Brueckner, 2004); airfares in AH and BH markets are
the same; and AB trips are now more expensive because they make use of two routes.13
Following the same reasoning as in scenario (FC,FC), fully-served markets require g > gHS
where
gHS  P 1   f 1 = 2 +

2
  3
8
. (16)
Graphically, this situation looks like the one under (FC,FC) depicted in Figure 2.
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). When exclusion from air-travel is an
issue, plugging (3) and (6) into (14) and maximizing yields
f 1 =
5=2 + g   2
8   1 , p

1 =  +

2
and P 1 =
4(=2 + g + 2) +   2
8   1 . (17)
From P 1   f 1 we obtain expression (16), i.e., gHS = P 1   f 1 = P 1   f 1 = 2 +
=2 3=8. Finally, the brand-loyalty threshold under which passengers prefer the outside
option is
aHS = P

1   f 1   g. (18)
Note that, when market AB is fully served, then aHS = 0 and g = P 1   f 1 . Then, it
is easy to check that f 1 = f

1 =
3
8
and P 1 = P

1 = 2 +

2
.14 Equivalently, when g = gHS
we also recover the results with fully-served markets.
As suggested before, carriers under HS networks o¤er higher frequency than under FC
networks (frequency e¤ect), but they charge higher airfares in market AB because of the
use of two routes to serve the market (airfare e¤ect), as it is spelt out in the following
lemma (where carrier subscripts are dropped).
Lemma 1 From comparing (FC,FC) and (HS,HS), we observe
i) frequency e¤ect: f HS > f

FC = F

FC (fully-served markets); and f

HS > f

FC ; F

FC
(partially-served markets); and
ii) airfare e¤ect: P HS > P

FC (fully-served markets); and P

HS > P

FC (partially-served
markets).
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Air-transport cost reduces ight frequency and increases fares charged by airlines and
this a¤ects the threshold values of g delimiting the relevant margin of choice. The follow-
ing lemma, that arises from comparing gFC and gHS, states that uncovered markets are
more likely to be observed under a certain network structure depending on the cost of air
transport.
Lemma 2 Partially-served markets are more likely to be observed under:
i) HS structures when  > 1
8
. In this case gFC < gHS and therefore aFC < aHS; and
ii) FC structures when  < 1
8
. In this case gFC > gHS and therefore aFC > aHS.
Interestingly, these two lemmas are closely linked to each other. When air-transport
cost is high (as in part i of the previous lemma), the airfare e¤ect dominates the frequency
e¤ect and competition is softer under HS structures (because fares are higher under HS
networks, and this is not compensated by frequencies). On the other hand, when air-
transport cost is low (as in part ii of the previous lemma), the frequency e¤ect dominates
the airfare e¤ect and competition is softer under FC structures (because frequencies are
lower under FC networks, and this is not compensated by fares).
Consequently, uncovered markets that are characterized by softer competition (because
airlines compete against the outside option) are more likely to be observed under HS
congurations when air-transport cost is high; and under FC congurations when air-
transport cost is low.
For instance, consider a high air-transport cost environment where gFC < gHS (as in
part i of the previous lemma). For any value of g such that gFC < g < gHS, airlines
compete against the outside option under HS structures; but they compete against each
other under FC networks, as shown in Figure 4. The opposite behavior is observed in a
low air-transport cost environment for any g such that gHS < g < gFC .
2.3 The Asymmetric (FC,HS) Network Scenario
Along this subsection, we need to distinguish between carriers 1 and 2 because they make
di¤erent network choices. Without loss of generality, we assume that carrier 1 adopts a
FC network, whereas carrier 2 serves AB city-pair market through two-segment trips that
stop at the hub city H. Hence, airlinesprots are given by
1 = 2 p1q1|{z}
RAH1 =R
BH
1
+ P1Q1| {z }
RAB1
  2[(f1)2 + q1| {z }
CAH1 =C
BH
1
]  [(F1)2 + Q1| {z }
CAB1
] and
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2 = 2 p2q2|{z}
RAH2 =R
BH
2
+ P2Q2| {z }
RAB2
  2[(f2)2 + (q2 +Q2)| {z }
CAH2 =C
BH
2
].
(i)Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). Substituting (3), (4) and the corresponding
terms for carrier 2 (analogous expressions with the 1 and 2 subscripts interchanged) in the
prot functions, we obtain the following equilibrium values for carrier 1
f 1 =
3+2+12(3 2)
2A
, F 1 = f

1 +

(6 1) , p

1 =  + 2f

1 , P

1 =  + 2F

1 , (19)
and for carrier 2
f 2 =
3(3 1) 2
2(12 5) , p

2 = 2
92(2+4 1) 22++5=2
A
, P 2 = 2
32(6+20 3) 38++5
A
,
(20)
where A = (6   1)(12   5). The main di¤erence with respect to the previous (sym-
metric) scenarios is that now y + F 1   P 1 + a = y + f 2   P 2   a occurs for a value of a
di¤erent from 0 because F 1   P 1 6= f 2   P 2 . Let us denote by ba this brand-loyalty level:
ba= 6(1  8) + 16   1
A
. (21)
Therefore y + F 1   P 1 + ba = y + f 2   P 2   ba; and thus the relevant margin of choice is
airline 1/airline 2 when this utility exceeds y   g. From this expression we can derive the
level of g that draws up the boundaries for a relevant outside option:
gFC;HS =
32(24   29) + 12(18   11) + 61=2 + 18   3=
2A
. (22)
Consequently, fully-served markets require g > gFC;HS. In this case, the brand-loyalty
threshold determining the relevant margin of choice for carrier 1 (a1FC;HS  P 1   F 1   g)
di¤ers from the one of carrier 2 (a2FC;HS  P 2   f 2   g), as shown in Figure 5.
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). Substituting (3), (6) and the cor-
responding terms for carrier 2 (analogous expressions with the 1 and 2 subscripts inter-
changed) in the prot functions, we obtain
f 1 =
6(2 1)+2 g
B
, F 1 =
=2+g 
4 1 , p

1 = 2f

1 , P

1 =  + 2F

1 (23)
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for airline 1 and
f 2 =
(15+6g)  9
2
+2 g
B
, p2 =  + 2
(12 5) (2 g)+1=2
B
,
P 2 =  +
2[4g(3 1)+62+ 1=] (6 1)
B
(24)
for airline 2 with B = 1+2(24 11). Shifting attention to utility functions, y+F 1  
P 1 + a = y + f

2   P 2   a occurs for a = bba and airlines start competing against the
outside option when y + F 1   P 1 + bba = y + f 2   P 2   bba < y   g holds with
bba=
2
6(1  8) + 16   1
5 + 2(48   25) . (25)
From this expression we can derive the threshold level for g ensuring a relevant outside
option:
g
FC;HS
=
22(48   55) + 12(24   13) + 35+ 18   3=
2(5 + 2(48   25)) .
Therefore, some low-brand loyalty travelers will not y for g < g
FC;HS
. Graphically, this
situation looks like the one depicted in Figure 5 but with di¤erent threshold values.
Consequently, we have shown in the above analysis that di¤erent critical values of g
arise in the two considered frameworks (i.e., (i) Market AB fully served by airlines; and
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines).
Hence, we are left with four critical values of g (i.e., gFC , gHS, gFC;HS and gFC;HS) that
determine ve regions, that are fully characterized in Lemma 3. This lemma asserts that,
depending on the cost of air transport, uncovered markets are more likely to be observed
under a certain network structure, completing the insight anticipated in Lemmas 1  2.
Lemma 3 Partially-served markets are more likely to be observed under:
i) HS structures when  > 1
8
. In this case gFC < gFC;HS < gFC;HS < gHS; and
ii) FC structures when  < 1
8
. In this case gFC > gFC;HS > gFC;HS > gHS.
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We can observe the regions resulting from plotting these threshold values of g in Figures
6 7. Note that g determines the relevant margin of choice in the market since high values
of g (i.e., expensive outside option) yield to a perfect duopoly where airlines compete
against each other (see Region A in both gures); whereas low values of g (i.e., attractive
outside option) yield to monopolistic situations where carriers compete against the outside
option (see Region E in both gures). Region A portrays the simplest scenario because
the outside option does not play any role and airlines exercise market power to a¤ect the
division of a xed amount of tra¢ c between them. In this case, airlines exert no monopoly
power over any passenger, although they can still a¤ect the division of the xed tra¢ c pool
by their choices of fares and frequencies. On the other extreme, in Region E the outside
option is always relevant. Under these circumstances, carriers enjoy monopolistic power
and passengers with low brand-loyalty make use of the outside option.
For intermediate values of g, the order of the threshold values depends on the magnitude
of air-transport costs. This result eshes out and reinforces the intuition revealed by
Lemmas 1  2, conrming that softer competition under HS structures emerges with high
air-transport costs (part i of the previous lemma); while softer competition under FC
structures emerges with low air-transport costs (part ii of the previous lemma).
Hence, airlines decide whether to compete against each other in each of the regions (that
are determined by the cost of the outside option g). When they compete against each other,
the relevant margin of choice is airline 1/airline 2 and markets are fully served (in this case
there is a high Fi   Pi for i = 1; 2). On the other hand, when they do not compete
against each other, the relevant margin is preferred airline/outside option and markets are
partially served (in this case there is a low Fi   Pi for i = 1; 2). The relevant margin of
choice is thus determined endogenously depending on the cost of the outside option relative
to the frequency-airfare-pair o¤ered by each carrier in each scenario.15 These decisions are
Nash-proved and, when both airlines decide not to compete against each other, none of
them is interested in deviating by lowering fares (or increasing frequency) to capture some
travelers loyal to the rival carrier.
Finally, in Regions C (in Figure 6) and C(in Figure 7), the relevant margin of choice
under (FC,HS) is unclear.16
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3 Equilibria in Airline Networks
In this section, taking into consideration the optimal fare-and-frequency choice under each
possible network scenario, we take notice of the possible equilibria in networks (i.e., we
proceed by backwards induction). Carriers decide simultaneously and independently be-
tween two strategies: either to adopt a FC or a HS network structure. Nevertheless, before
drawing any conclusion, we need to assert the relevant region (R) in our analysis where
fares and travel volumes are positive; and second-order and non-arbitrage conditions17 are
satised. In R, all the results are comparable.
Denition 1 R is the region in the space f; ;  ; gg ensuring positive airfares and travel
volumes; and compliance with second-order and non-arbitrage conditions in all the scenar-
ios.
In R, we require  <   (1 + 2)=8 and  > 7=12 to hold. See Appendix A for
the details. Given the structure of the suggested game, the following results are simply
obtained by comparing (FC; FC) and (HS;FC) on the one hand; and (HS;HS)
and (FC;HS) on the other hand, where the rst element between parentheses gives the
own-network strategy and the second element indicates the rivals strategy.
The equilibria in airline networks are presented for each possible case. Firstly, we make
a distinction depending on the magnitude of air-transport costs, (i.e., either  > 1
8
or
 < 1
8
); and secondly, we study each possible region depending on the value of g as
depicted in Figures 6 and 7.
Therefore, we have six possible cases: (i) Region A: market AB fully served by airlines;
(ii) Region E: market AB partially served by airlines; (iii) region B: market AB partially
served under (HS,HS); (iv) Region D: market AB partially served under (HS,HS) and
(FC,HS); (v) Region B: market AB partially served under (FC,FC); and nally (vi)
Region D: market AB partially served under (FC,FC) and (FC,HS).
Remember that Regions A and E emerge for any value of  (see Figures 6 7), whereas
Regions B and D appear for  > 1
8
and Regions Band Dcome out for  < 1
8
. The
case  < 1
8
could be seen as more realistic in the current unregulated environment where
market competition keeps a downward pressure on airline costs.
To understand how the di¤erent equilibria arise in the gures (see Figures 8   10), it
su¢ ces to remember that it is enough to compare (FC; FC) and (HS;FC) on the one
hand; and (HS;HS) and (FC;HS) on the other hand. When we observe (FC; FC) >
15
(HS;FC), there is an equilibrium of the type (FC,FC); when (HS;HS) > (FC;HS)
happens, the conguration (HS,HS) arises as an equilibrium in networks; and nally when
both (HS;HS) < (FC;HS) and (FC; FC) < (HS;FC) are observed, the equilib-
rium is asymmetric because carriersnetwork choices do not coincide.
These prot comparisons determine some critical values for the marginal cost per seat
( ) that depend on the other parameters of the model and delimit the di¤erent equilibrium
areas. From the comparison between (FC; FC) and (HS;FC) we obtain  1; and from
(HS;HS) and (FC;HS) we obtain  2 and 

3 (but in some gures 

3 does not appear
because  3 > ).
3.1 High Air-Transport Cost ( > 18)
Figures 8  9 portray the detailed equilibria in presence of high air-transport costs, where
the following order of threshold values for  is observed:  1 < 

2 < 

3. Thus, the equilib-
rium in airline networks is: (HS,HS) for  <  1; the multiple equilibria {(HS,HS),(FC,FC)}
for  2 ( 1;  2); (FC,FC) for  2 ( 2;  3); and nally the structure {(HS,HS),(FC,FC)}
again for  >  3.
Once prots are compared, the constraint  > 1
8
has to be taken into account be-
cause it rules out some possible equilibrium areas. Only those areas compatible with the
aforementioned constraint are relevant in the analysis.18 The precise location of  = 1
8
in Figures 8   9 depends on the value of the parameters. 1
8
2 ( 1;minf 3; g) is always
observed but both 1
8
<  2 and
1
8
>  2 are possible. Independently of this ambiguity,
(FC,FC) is always a possible equilibrium for any value of  . Therefore, our rst result
states that, in presence of high transport cost, FC structures prevail in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 When  > 1
8
, (FC,FC) always arises as an equilibrium in airline networks
for any value of  .
This result can help to explain the high-cost environment existing before the deregula-
tion where carriers used to operate FC. We know from Lemmas 1  3 that competition is
softer under HS congurations in presence of high air-transport costs. Since FC congura-
tions prevail in equilibrium, we can ascertain a bias towards network structures implying
higher levels of competition (i.e., networks where carriers compete against each other).
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3.2 Low Air-Transport Cost ( < 18)
The possible equilibria in airline networks when air-transport costs are low are depicted in
Figures 8 and 10. Once prots are compared and the constraint  < 1
8
has been taken into
account, we appreciate that HS structures dominate in equilibrium and that asymmetric
equilibria may occur for certain parameter values.
In fact, most of the areas where (FC,FC) appeared as an equilibrium in the previous
case are now ruled out and (HS,HS) always emerges as a possible equilibrium (but not for
any value of ). The following result states that, in presence of low transport costs, HS
structures prevail in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 When  < 1
8
, (HS,HS) always arises as an equilibrium in airline net-
works.
When the cost of air transport is low, carriers operate HS. This is what we observed
after the deregulation of the airline sector when carriers became free to make strategic
network choices in a competitive framework that exerted a downward pressure over air-
transport costs. As before, we detect a bias towards network structures implying higher
levels of competition since competition is softer under FC congurations in presence of low
air-transport costs (from Lemmas 1  3) and HS congurations prevail in equilibrium.
The order of the critical values for the marginal cost per seat ( ) is the same as in the
previous case; except in Region B(see Figure 10) where  2 < 

1 occurs and an asymmetric
equilibrium {(FC,HS),(HS,FC)} comes up for  2 ( 2;  1).
Corollary 1 Under  < 1
8
, an asymmetric equilibrium where one carrier adopts a FC
network and the other operates HS is possible for intermediate values of cost per seat and
competition intensity.
In this realistic framework in which markets may be partially served, asymmetric con-
gurations where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy
may arise when cost per seat and competition intensity and are moderate. In particular,
this behavior is detected on Region Bwhere market AB is partially served under (FC,FC)
network congurations. Therefore asymmetric equilibria are possible without introducing
any explicit asymmetry (neither in costs nor in demand parameters). This result is relevant
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to the extent that it captures the actual coexistence of alternative network strategies in
the airline industry, as pointed out by Alderighi et al. (2005).
Summing up, in a framework characterized by low air-transport costs, carriers adopt
hubbing strategies, as happened following the deregulation of the industry. As costs in-
crease, economies of tra¢ c density weaken and airlinesincentives to pool passengers from
several markets into the same plane disappear. In this environment, carriers prefer to avoid
multi-segment markets and they choose to serve city-pair markets directly to minimize the
use of expensive routes. Consequently, FC structures occur in equilibrium when costs are
su¢ ciently high. In addition, asymmetric network congurations may arise in equilibrium
when air-transport costs are low.
4 The Social Optimum
With the equilibria in airline networks understood, attention now shifts to welfare analysis
where a social planner decides ight frequency and tra¢ c so as to maximize social surplus,
that is computed as the sum of total utility and airline prot. Social surplus depends on
airlinesnetwork choices. Nevertheless, the social optimum is independent of the interaction
between carriers, i.e., there is an optimum for carriers operating FC and another optimum
for HS carriers. As in the equilibrium analysis, we need to distinguish between the situation
with fully-served markets and the situation where market AB is partially served.
4.1 The (FC,FC) Scenario
Total utility for carrier 1 in market AH (or BH) can be written
UAH1 (FC) =
Z =2
0
(y + f1   p1 + a) 1

da =
y + f1   p1
2
+

8
. (26)
Assuming that market AB is partially served by airlines, some passengers will not under-
take air travel since they will choose the outside option to travel between cities A and
B:
UAB1 (FC) =
Z =2
a
(y + F1   P1 + a) 1

da| {z }
Air tra¢ c
+
Z a
0
(y   g) 1

da| {z }
Outside option tra¢ c
=
18
=
y
2
+ (F1   P1)

1
2
  a



+

8
+
(a)2
2
  ga


, (27)
where a denotes the air-travel/outside option loyalty margin, since airlines compete against
the outside option in city-pair market AB. Note that, when market AB is fully served by
airlines, then a = 0 and UAB1 (FC) = U
AH
1 (FC).
Carrier 1s total prot equals
1(FC) = 2(p1   )
Z =2
0
1

da  2(f1)2| {z }
market AH and market BH
+ (P1   )
Z =2
a
1

da  (F1)2| {z }
market AB
=
= (p1   ) + (P1   )

1
2
  a



  2(f1)2   (F1)2. (28)
Note that the 2 factor appears because markets AH and BH are identical; and that in
market AB we only consider those passengers that undertake air travel (because airlines
do not obtain any prot from passengers making use of the outside option).
Adding utilities and prots for both carriers we obtain
W (FC; FC) = 4UAH1 (FC) + 2U
AB
1 (FC) + 21(FC) =
= 2
8>>><>>>:3y
Z =2
0
1

da| {z }
Income
  g
Z a
0
1

da| {z }
Outside options cost
+ 2
Z =2
0
a

da+
Z =2
a
a

da| {z }
Average brand-loyalty benets
+
+2f
Z =2
0
1

da+ F
Z =2
a
1

da| {z }
Frequency benets
  [(2
Z =2
0
1

+
Z =2
a
1

da) + (2f 2 + F 2)| {z }
Costs
]
9>>>=>>>;,
where we can eliminate the subscripts since both carriers are identical. Notice that the two
rst elements give income from the three markets and the cost of the outside option for
those passengers that do not make use of air transport. The last three terms are the average
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brand-loyalty benets, the frequency benets and the costs for those passengers undertak-
ing air travel. The 2 factor is necessary because two airlines are present. Performing the
integration, we obtain
= 3y   2g a

+ 3
4
  (a)2

+ 2f + 2F (1
2
  a

)  2   2(1
2
  a

)  4f 2   2F 2, (29)
The planner chooses a which determines the optimal air tra¢ c, along with ight
frequencies to maximize (29). Observe that airfares do not appear in the expression because
they are a transfer between airlines and air travelers. The rst-order condition for choice
of a yields
a =    F SO   g  aSOFC , (30)
indicating that, for AB-market air travelers, the marginal cost is exactly balanced by the
benets from brand loyalty and frequency and the outside-options cost. By comparing
(13) with (30) it is easy to check that aFC > aSOFC since P
 >  (as it can be seen by
inspection). Therefore, too many passengers make use of the outside option to travel in
equilibrium, as can be observed in Figure 11.
From (30) and the rst-order condition for f and F , we obtain
fSO =
1
4
, F SO =
=2   + g
2   1 . (31)
Using these results, the social optimum and equilibrium are easily compared from ex-
pressions (10), (12) and (31).
Proposition 3 With market AB being partially served by airlines under (FC,FC), the
equilibrium has e¢ cient ight frequency in markets AH and BH (i.e., f FC = f
SO
FC), sub-
optimal ight frequency in market AB (i.e., F FC < F
SO
FC ) and too few air travelers (i.e.,
aFC > a
SO
FC).
The proposition shows that the equilibrium is ine¢ cient only in city-pair market AB
where markets are partially served and airlines compete against the outside option. In this
case, each airline has e¤ective monopoly power over its passengers, whose next best choice
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is the outside option. In a familiar fashion, this monopoly power leads to a suboptimal level
of tra¢ c with underprovision of frequency. Consistently, there are too few air travelers in
equilibrium, as in BF and Brueckner (2004).
By contrast, in markets AH and BH, the entire population undertakes air travel in
equilibrium, so that there is no ine¢ cient allocation of passengers. Equilibrium frequencies
are e¢ cient and airlines exert no monopoly power over any passenger. Nevertheless, the
exercise of market power can still a¤ect the distribution of a xed amount of tra¢ c between
carriers through their relative choices of fares and frequencies. This result is also in line
with the one in BF that considers only one FC market.19
Note that, when market AB is fully served by airlines, then a = 0 (or equivalently
UAH1 (FC) = U
AB
1 (FC) and F = f) and the welfare function becomes W (FC; FC) =
3(y + 
4
+ f      2f2). Then it is easy to check that fSO = F SO = 1
4
,20 as portrayed in
the following corollary.
Corollary 2 With fully-served markets under (FC,FC), the equilibrium ight frequency is
e¢ cient (i.e., f FC = f
SO
FC =
1
4
).
Again, as in BF, frequency is socially optimal when the relevant margin of choice is
airline 1/airline 2.
4.2 The (HS,HS) Scenario
Total utility for carrier 1 in market AH (or BH) is the same as UAH1 (FC) since this
market is always served nonstop and there is no outside option. Assuming that market
AB is partially served by airlines, airline 1s utility in this market is logically given by
UAB1 (FC) but replacing F1 by f1 since now there is no direct connection between cities A
and B. On the prots side,
1(HS) = 2(p1   )
Z =2
0
1

da+ (P1   2)
Z =2
a
1

da  2(f1)2, (32)
where the main di¤erences with respect to 1(FC) are the element (P1   2) that cap-
tures that the AB market needs to use two routes to be served (AH + BH); and the
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absence of aircraft-operation cost in route AB since this route is not operated under a HS
conguration. Welfare is therefore given by
W (HS;HS) = 4UAH1 (HS) + 2U
AB
1 (HS) + 21(HS) =
= 2
8>>><>>>:3y
Z =2
0
1

da| {z }
Income
  g
Z a
0
1

da| {z }
Outside options cost
+ 2
Z =2
0
a

da+
Z =2
a
a

da| {z }
Average brand-loyalty benets
+
+2f
Z =2
0
1

da+ f
Z =2
a
1

da| {z }
Frequency benets
  [(2
Z =2
0
1

+ 2
Z =2
a
1

da) + 2f 2| {z }
Costs
]
9>>>=>>>; =
= 3y   2g a

+ 3
4
  (a)2

+ 2f + 2f(1
2
  a

)  2   4(1
2
  a

)  4f2. (33)
The interpretation of this expression is similar to the one for W (FC; FC), except for the
di¤erences in UAB1 and 1 previously commented.
The rst-order condition for choice of a yields now
a = 2   fSO   g  aSOHS, (34)
where the sole di¤erence with respect to the FC case is the 2 factor revealing the use of
two routes to serve market AB. As in the FC scenario, aHS > aSOHS since P
 > 2 and
hence there are too few air travelers (same situation as the one depicted in Figure 11).
From (34) and the rst-order condition for f , we obtain
fSO =
3=2  2 + g
4   1 . (35)
The following proposition compares the equilibrium frequency with the social optimum
under the HS scenario (i.e., expressions (35) and (17)).
Proposition 4 With market AB being partially served by airlines under (HS,HS), there
is an underprovision of ight frequency when g is high; but both overprovision and under-
provision of frequency can be observed when g is low.
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Before the deregulation, airlines faced constraints in fares and route structures and com-
petition was concentrated in service quality (ight frequency). This competition focused
on ight frequency was thought to generate excessive frequencies. After the deregulation,
with airlines free to compete on airfares, softer competition on frequency was expected but
exactly the opposite occurred in many routes. The explanation comes from considering
another important consequence of the deregulation: the adoption of HS networks. In fact,
HS networks and the concentration of tra¢ c on the spoke routes generated an increase
in ight frequency. The result in Proposition 4, compared to the one in Proposition 3,
reects the transition from FC to HS congurations occurred after the deregulation, since
frequencies can become excessive in presence of partially-served markets (i.e., we need g is
su¢ ciently low such that the outside option is e¤ectively taken into account by passengers).
Thus, uncovered markets seem to constitute an important element explaining the apparent
overprovision of frequencies in the current airline unregulated environment.
Brueckner (2004) considers network choice in a monopoly setting; and BF brings up
a competitive setting with partially-served markets in a single FC market. These two
papers detect an underprovision of frequencies, a nding that seems to be precise in a
single-market setting but not in the current unregulated environment where most carriers
organize their networks in a HS manner. In a competitive context where carriers are free
to make strategic network choices and city-pair markets may be uncovered by airlines, we
can explain the extensive network reorganization observed after the deregulation with the
adoption of hubbing strategies and the noticeable excess of ight frequency in many HS
routes.
Note that, when market AB is fully served by airlines, then a = 0 and W (HS;HS) =
3y + 3
4
+ 3f   4   4f 2. In this case, the maximization yields fSO = 3
8
as shown in the
following corollary.21
Corollary 3 With fully-served markets under (HS,HS), the equilibrium ight frequency is
e¢ cient (i.e., f HS = f
SO
HS =
3
8
).
Corollaries 2   3 highlight the idea that uncovered markets are an important element
to take into account when trying to analyze frequency e¢ ciency in the airline industry.
Without this element, frequencies are always optimal independently of airlinesnetwork
structure.22
23
The optimal values of ight frequency and tra¢ c for the asymmetric scenario (FC,HS)
are simply the ones obtained under (FC,FC) for the carrier operating FC and the ones
obtained under (HS,HS) for the HS airline.23
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented airline network choice in a competitive unregulated environment.
Allowing airlines to make strategic network choices, along with the possibility of having
uncovered markets such that low brand-loyalty passengers make use of an outside option,
yields interesting results. HS structures prevail in presence of low air-transport costs and
asymmetric equilibria arise without introducing any explicit asymmetry in the model. In
addition, with HS congurations air travelers are too few and ight frequency can become
excessive.
As it has been shown, the deregulation of the sector had important network implica-
tions for airlines. Following our results, hubbing strategies should prevail in the current
competitive context characterized by low costs. Although the remarkable dynamism of the
airline industry could result in a di¤erent context in the next future, the considered setup
is su¢ ciently broad to incorporate new features into the analysis. For instance, if the in-
tegration trend observed in the last years keeps stepping forward, a new environment with
few major players (around SkyTeam, Star Alliance and oneworld) seems to be possible.
This would lead to a further rationalization of routes and the consequent cost saving that
would exaggerate the phenomenon of hubbing, as predicted by our model.
A possible extension would be to introduce constraints to airport growth stemming
from land availability or noise regulation in airportssurroundings.24 This restrictions are
already present and could become a major factor a¤ecting airlinesnetwork strategy and
slowing down hubbing processes.
Another natural extension of the considered analysis involves introducing explicit asym-
metries (in cost parameters) to di¤erentiate among legacy carriers, regional operators (that
o¤er higher service quality) and low-cost carriers. This analysis could probably provide
some insights about the distinctive network choices characterizing each carrier type. More-
over, the presence of low-cost carriers could mitigate the excessive exclusion arising in the
presented model.
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Notes
1Morrison and Whinston showed that a route-weighted measure of ight frequency rose by 9:2 percent
between 1977 and 1983, generating passenger benets in excess of $10 billion per year.
2FC network structures provide direct connections in every city-pair market, whereas HS refer to
networks organized around a main airport (hub).
3In BF there is an exogenous proportion of high and low-type passengers depending on their valuation
of travel. High types choose between the two carriers and low types choose between their preferred airline
and an outside option.
4The same network is considered in Brueckner (2004) and Oum et al. (1995) since it is the simplest
possible structure allowing for comparisons between HS and FC congurations.
5Allowing for the use of an outside option in city-pair markets AH and BH, would imply that all
the markets may be partially served. Although the framework would be more general, we restrict this
possibility to market AB for simplicity since the results of the analysis do not change qualitatively.
6Introducing frequencies additively in the utility function simplies the analysis with respect to the
approach in BF, where higher frequencies reduce the cost of schedule delay. A similar formulation to ours
is suggested in Heimer and Shy (2006).
7As suggested in Brueckner and Spiller (1991) under a very di¤erent specication.
8The trend consisting in restructuring airline networks around hubs that occured after the deregulation
(hubbing), consisted precisely in trying to attain cost savings from eliminating secondary routes by pooling
passengers from several markets into the same plane.
9Multi-segment trips can be ignored in this scenario since cheaper direct connections are available in
all the markets.
10In BF, the simultaneous and the sequential choice of f and p are compared. In the sequential case,
frequency is smaller than in the simultaneous-choice case; and fares involve a smaller markup over marginal
seat cost.
11When aFC = 0 then g = P 1   F 1 . Substituting in P 1 and F 1 , we get P 1 = 
2+2F1 +(2 1)
2 1
and F 1 =
=2+P1  
4 . From these expressions, we obtain directly the results with fully-served markets in
(10).
12It could be argued that multi-segment trips are more costly for passengers that need to make stops
and wait for connecting planes. Adding a disutility parameter into the travelersutility when trips are HS
is easy to implement (and could be seen as more realistic). However, it does not provide any additional
insight (and introduces a new parameter) since the results are qualitatively equivalent with the exception
that the equilibrium areas where carriers operate HS are smaller.
13Under (HS,HS), there is no F1 since the route AB is ruled out.
14When aHS = 0, then g = P 1  f1 and, substituting in P 1 and f1 we get P 1 = 2
2 4f1 ++2(4 1)
4 1
and f1 =
5=2+P1  2
8 . From these expressions, we obtain directly the results with fully-served markets
in (15).
15This di¤ers from BF, where there is an exogenous proportion of high and low-type passengers depending
on their valuation of travel. In BF, high types choose between the two carriers whereas low types choose
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between their preferred airline and an outside option.
16In Regions C and C, each particular value of g has a utility associated to it, i.e., y + F 1   P 1 + a
for carrier 1; and y + F 2   P 2   a for carrier 2.
In these regions, airlines face competition both from the rival airline and from the outside option.
More precisely, when airlines compete more aggressively (i.e., carriers increase F    P ), the relevant
margin of choice is airline 1/airline 2. On the other hand, when airlines reduce F    P , they compete
against the outside option and the relevant margin becomes preferred carrier/outside option.
17It is important to note that, while pi and Pi are set independently, fares must satisfy a non-arbitrage
condition. This condition says that an AB passenger must not be able to travel cheaper by purchasing
two separate tickets (in routes AH and BH), and it is written Pi < 2pi for i = 1; 2.
18Therefore, the constraint  > 18 has to be taken into account for a double reason: rstly because
it is fundamental in determining the existence of partially-served markets in each region (it di¤erentiates
between the cases in Figures 6 and 7); and secondly because it rules out some possible equilibrium regions
arising from prot comparisons (as shown in Figures 8  9).
19In BF the ine¢ ciency only a¤ects the low-type passengers (that choose between their preferred airline
and the outside option).
20Applying a = 0 and using (30) and (31), we recover the social-optimum value with fully-served
markets.
21Applying a = 0 and using (34) and (35), we recover the social-optimum value with fully-served
markets.
22A di¤erent question would be to study network e¢ ciency. Typically, when the outside option is
su¢ ciently attractive, HS structures are more e¢ cient that FC structures because they endow with higher
frequency and more passengers undertake air travel.
23Assuming without loss of generality that carrier 1 adopts a FC network and that carrier 2 operates HS,
welfare is given byW (FC;HS) = 2UAH1 (FC)+U
AB
1 (FC)+1(FC)+2U
AH
2 (HS)+U
AB
2 (HS)+2(HS) =
1
2W (FC;FC)+
1
2W (FC;FC) = 3y  g a

1
   g a

2
 +
3
4   (a

1)
2
2   (a

2)
2
2 + f1+ f2+F1(
1
2   a

1
 )+ f2(
1
2   a

2
 ) 
2   ( 12   a

1
 )   2( 12   a

2
 )   2f21   F 21   2f22 , and the social optimum for carrier 1 is the one given
in the (FC,FC) scenario, whereas the one for airline 2 is the one provided in the (HS,HS) case.
24Brueckner and Girvin (2006) study the e¤ect of airport noise regulation, focusing on ight frequency
and aircraft quietness. However, the implications of such regulation on airline network structure, remain
to be studied.
27
Figures
Figure 1: Network structure
Figure 2: Utilities in scenario (FC,FC)
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Figure 3: A relevant outside option under (FC,FC)
Figure 4: Case g 2 (gFC ; gHS) when  > 18
29
Figure 5: Scenario (FC,HS) with fully-served markets
30
Figure 6: Regions with high air-transport costs
Figure 7: Regions with low air-trasport costs
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Figure 8: Equilibrium in Regions A and E (both for  > 1
8
and  < 1
8
)
Figure 9: Equilibrium in Regions B and D (for  > 1
8
)
32
Figure 10: Equilibrium in Regions Band D(for  < 1
8
)
Figure 11: Too few air travelers in equilibrium
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A Appendix: The Relevant Region (R)
Some restrictions on the parameters of the model need to be observed to ensure positive
airfares, travel volumes and compliance with second-order and the non-arbitrage conditions
in all the scenarios. The precise details of the computations are available from the author
upon request.
(a) Second-order conditions (both for partially and fully served AB market). The
Hessian matrix is denite negative for  > 1=4 in the (FC,FC) case; for  > 3=8 in the
(HS,HS) scenario. Naturally, in the (FC,HS) case, the restrictions are  > 1=4 for carrier
1 and  > 3=8 for carrier 2.
(b) Positivity conditions (i.e., pi; Pi; qi; Qi; fi; Fi > 0 for i = 1; 2).
(i) Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). The (FC,FC) and the (HS,HS) scenarios
do not impose any restriction. The asymmetric setting (FC,HS) requires  > 1=2 and
 <  1  (6   1)=4 (from Q2 > 0).
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). In this case and given that there are
four parameters, we provide su¢ cient conditions for  (i.e., lower bounds) and  (i.e.,
upper bounds) that hold for any value of g. The (FC,FC) scenario requires  <  2  =2
(from F 1 and Q

1 > 0); the case (HS,HS) imposes  <  3  (1+ 2)=8 (from Q1 > 0);
and nally from the setting (FC,HS) we get  <  3 as under (HS,HS) (now from Q2 > 0)
and  > 7=12 (from p1 and q

1 > 0) with  > g that seems reasonable since  needs to
be su¢ ciently high.
(c) Non-arbitrage conditions (i.e., Pi  2pi for i = 1; 2 for airlines operating HS
networks, to ensure that no AB passenger is able to break down the trip into two parts).
(i) Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). There are no further restrictions in any
scenario when  > 1=2.
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). The asymmetric setting (FC,HS)
does not impose any restriction; and under (HS,HS) networks, the non-arbitrage condition
imposes g < (3 + 4   1)=2 which is always satised when g < gHS.
The intersection of all the aforementioned constraints leaves us with  > 7=12 and  <
 3  (1 + 2)=8 since  3 <  1;  2, and we redene  3   . 
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B Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Prior to any proof, it is necessary to specify that we restrict attention to the parameter re-
gion where the variables are positive and this requires  > 7=12 and  <   (1+2)=8
(this is thoroughly explained in Appendix A).
i) Frequency e¤ect.
I f HS > f FC = F FC is straightforward (fully-served markets);
I f HS > f FC holds for g > 2   2   14 and this is always true because g > 0 and
2   
2
  1
4
< 0 for  <  .
I f HS > F FC holds for g < bg = 4 + 32   12 . When g is low, we know that g < gFC =
 + 
2
  1
4
. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show gFC < bg. The latter inequality requires  < 
which holds because  <  <  for  > 1=6.
ii) Airfare e¤ect.
I P HS > P FC is straightforward (fully-served markets);
I P HS > P FC holds for  > e = +2g 321622 6+1 . Therefore, it is su¢ cient to show that e < 0
because  > 0. The denominator of e is obviously positive; and the numerator is negative
for g < eg = 3
2
  1
2
. It is easy to check that gFC < eg requires  < 4 14 and  < 4 14 for
 > 1=2. Therefore, the numerator of e is negative and the proof is completed. 
Proof of Lemma 2.
Straightforward. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
i) Case  > 1
8
.
I gFC < gFC;HS holds for  > 6 116(3 1) or equivalently for 6(8   1) > 16   1 and
this implies  > 16 1
6(8 1) since  >
1
8
. It can be checked that,  > 16 1
6(8 1) is always
observed in R.
I gFC;HS < gFC;HS is true for  >
6 1
16(3 1) and therefore it always hold (because
 > 16 1
6(8 1) is always observed in R).
I g
FC;HS
< gHS requires  >
3(1+1622 10)
8(1+4822 22) . Since
1
8
> 3(1+16
22 10)
8(1+4822 22) in R, the in-
equality is always respected.
ii) Case  < 1
8
.
I gFC > gFC;HS holds for  < 6 116(3 1) or equivalently for 6(8   1) < 16   1 and
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this implies  > 16 1
6(8 1) since  <
1
8
. Thus, the initial inequality always holds (because
 > 16 1
6(8 1) is always observed in R).
I gFC;HS > gFC;HS is true for  <
6 1
16(3 1) and therefore it always hold (just proved
above).
I g
FC;HS
> gHS requires  <
3(1+1622 10)
8(1+4822 22) or equivalently for (192
2   88   24 + 15) < 3  8 .
The element between parentheses is negative for  < 1
8
in the relevant region R, so that
the inequality is always respected. 
Proof of Propositions 1  2 and Corollary 1.
Let us rename (FC; FC)  A, (HS;HS)  B, (FC;HS)  C and (HS;FC) 
D. To derive the equilibria in networks, we simply need to compute B C and A D
in the relevant region R. Remember that  1 is obtained from A   D; and that  2 and
 3 are obtained from B   C . The precise details of the computations are available from
the author upon request.
We need to compute the prots both for the cases of fully and partially-served markets.
(i)Market AB fully served by airlines (high g). With fully-served markets, prots are given
by FA =
3(4 1)
16
, FB =
3(8 3)
32
, FC =
3(4 1)[9(2 1)F+8F+G2]
4(12 5)2(6 1)2 , 
F
D =
3(3 1)H 4H+I2
4(12 5)2(6 1)2
where F , G, H, I > 0 and superscript F stands for "fully-served markets".
F = 3(6   1)2(2   1)(4   1), G = 242(4   1)[8(3   2) + 3],
H = (6   1)2(3   1)(8   3), I = 42f12[(24   19) + 4]  1g.
(ii) Market AB partially served by airlines (low g). With uncovered markets, prots de-
pend on g and are given by PA =
1+22[92+4(g )(+g ) 4=]
8(4 1) , 
P
B = 
92+4(g 2)(+g 2) 3=
2(8 1) ,
PC =
J+Kg+Lg2 M N2 Rg
4(4 1)[1+2(24 11)]2 , 
P
D =
S+Tg+Ug2 V +W2 Xg
2[1+2(24 11)]2 where J , K, L, M , N , R, S, T ,
U , V , W , X > 0 and superscript P stands for "partially-served markets".
J = 3f4[(48(108   155) + 3889)  875] + 289g,
K = 42f4[(144(4   5) + 337)  71] + 25g,
L = 12f4[(16(12   11) + 51)  5] + 1g,
M = 42f4[(48(12   19) + 529)  131] + 49g,
N = 4f4[(48(84   101) + 2039)  351] + 87g   8,
R = 8f4[(48(12   11) + 161)  19] + 5g,
S = 32f4[(216   227) + 87]  59g+ 12, T = 4f4[3(24   11)  5] + 11g,
U = 4f12[(24   19) + 4]  1g, V = 8f6[2(72   53) + 21]  5g+ 4,
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W = 322[18(8   5) + 13], X = 8f2[12(24   17) + 37]  1g.
Now, we have all the needed information to compute the equilibrium in airline networks
in each possible situation.
I g > maxfgFC ; gHSg (Region A: market AB never uncovered ) FA; FB; FC ; FD).
FA and 
F
B are independent of  whereas C is an increasing and convex function of  and
D is decreasing (for low values of ) and concave function of  . Hence FA and 
F
D intersect
for two values of  , i.e.,  1 and  2 with  1 <  2. It can be observed that  2 >  and thus
it is disregarded. On the other hand, FA and 
F
D intersect for two values of  , i.e.,  3 and
 4 with  3 <  4. Clearly  3 < 0 and thus it is disregarded. Therefore, we are left with  1
and  4 and it can be checked that 0 <  1 <  4 <  . Let us redene  1   1 and  4   2
to simplify notation. The precise expressions for  1 and 

2 are available from the author
upon request.
 When  2 (0;  1), FB > FC and FA < FD and thus the equilibrium is (HS,HS).
When  2 ( 1;  2), FB > FC and FA > FD and thus the equilibrium is {(HS,HS),(FC,FC)}.
 When  2 ( 2; ), FB < FC and FA > FD and thus the equilibrium is (FC,FC).
Finally, since typically  2 <
1
8
<  , there is a unique equilibrium (FC,FC) when  > 1
8
,
whereas the three aforementioned equilibria exist with  < 1
8
(as depicted in Figure 8).
I g < minfgFC ; gHSg (Region E: market AB always uncovered ) PA; PB; PC ; PD).
Function PC shifts downwards with respect to 
F
C (since @C=@g > 0) and becomes concave
with respect to  since L < N and g(
+
), as shown in Figure 8, crossing PB twice (i.e.,  3
and  4 with  3 <  4 < ). Function PD shifts downwards (since @D=@g > 0) with respect
to FD and becomes convex since U;W > 0, crossing 
F
A twice (i.e.,  1 and  2 with  1 <  2).
As in Region A,  2 >  and thus it is disregarded.
We are left with  1,  3 and  4 and it can be checked that 0 <  1 <  3 <  4 <  . Again,
we redene  1   1,  3   2 and  4   3 and the precise expressions for  1,  2 and  3 are
available from the author upon request.
 When  2 (0;  1), PB > PC and PA < PD and thus the equilibrium is (HS,HS).
When  2 ( 1;  2), PB > PC and PA > PD and thus the equilibrium is {(HS,HS),(FC,FC)}.
 When  2 ( 2;  3), PB < PC and PA > PD and thus the equilibrium is (FC,FC).
When  2 ( 3; ), PB > PC and PA > PD and thus the equilibrium is {(HS,HS),(FC,FC)}.
The precise location of  = 1
8
in Figure 8 depends on the value of the parameters and
both 1
8
<  2 and
1
8
>  2 are possible but
1
8
>  1 is always observed. Figure 8 considers
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the case  1 <
1
8
<  2.
I g 2 (g
FC;HS
; gHS) with  > 18 (Region B: market AB uncovered under (HS,HS) )
FA; 
P
B; 
F
C ; 
F
D).
 1 is the same as in Region A. Function 
P
B, that is independent of  for g = gHS =
2 + 
2
  3
8
(when PB = 
F
B), shifts downwards (since @
P
B=@g > 0) and typically becomes
downward sloping for g < gHS and low  , as shown in Figures 8 9. Then,  2 is smaller than
before (but always bigger than  1) and consequently the equilibrium {(HS,HS),(FC,FC)}
becomes a bit smaller than in Region A.
I g 2 (gFC;HS; gFC) with  < 18 (Region B: market AB uncovered under (FC,FC) )
PA; 
F
B; 
F
C ; 
F
D).
 2 is the same as in RegionA. Function 
P
A, that is independent of  for g = gFC = +

2
  1
4
(when PA = 
F
A), shifts downwards (since @
P
A=@g > 0) and typically becomes upward
sloping for g < gFC and low  , as shown in Figures 8 and 10. Since the intercept e¤ect is
stronger than the slope e¤ect,  1 is bigger than before and always surpasses 

2, giving rise
to the asymmetric equilibrium {(FC,HS),(HS,FC)}.
I g 2 (gFC ; gFC;HS) with  > 18 (Region D: market AB uncovered under (HS,HS) and
(FC,HS) ) FA; PB; PC ; PD).
PC and 
P
D behave as commented in Region E. Although 
F
A is now di¤erent, it does not
a¤ect the equilibrium regions. Figure 9 considers the case  2 <
1
8
<  3 (but 

1 <
1
8
<  2
is also possible).
I g 2 (gHS; gFC;HS) with  < 18 (Region D: market AB uncovered under (FC,FC) and
(FC,HS) ) PA; FB; PC ; PD).
PC and 
P
D behave as commented in Region E. Although 
F
B is now di¤erent, it does not
a¤ect the equilibrium regions, as shown in Figure 10. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
From expressions (12) and (31), it can be checked that f FC = f
SO
FC =
1
4
and that
F FC =
=2+g 
4 1 < F
SO
FC =
=2+g 
2 1 is always true. 
Proof of Corollary 2.
Straightforward. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
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When market AB is uncovered by airlines (i.e., g < gHS  2 + 2   38 ), it can be
checked from expressions (17) and (35) that f HS = f
SO
HS occurs for g =
8 1 2
4
and
8 1 2
4
< gHS  2 + 2   38 . In addition, 8 1 24 > 0 for  > (2   1)=8 and this
is possible because (2   1)=8 <  always holds. Therefore, when g < 8 1 2
4
then
f HS > f
SO
HS (overprovision); and when g 2
 
8 1 2
4
; gHS

then f HS < f
SO
HS (underprovi-
sion). 
Proof of Corollary 3.
Straightforward. 
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